Abstract

The sustainable management of common resources constitutes a social dilemma with short-term individual interests conflicting with long-term collective interests. In my work, I examine social dilemma situations in which group members have unequal opportunities (e.g., unequal access to a common resource). While previous work suggests that voting on extraction levels can increase sustainable resource management, these voting institutions were often externally imposed. If change has to come from within the group, who is likely to be the one to suggest change when resources are decreasing? What characterizes suggestions made? The current project examines whether the possibility to suggest and vote on new distributions of maximum extraction levels increases sustainable resource management and whether the effect depends on the (in)equality among group members.

About the speaker

Laila Elina Nockur, Assistant Professor, Department of Psychology and Behavioural Sciences, Aarhus University

Free of charge - All are welcome