Voting institutions in unequal commons dilemmas
IMC Tuesday Seminar: Talk by Laila Elina Nockur, Assistant Professor, Department of Psychology and Behavioural Sciences, Aarhus University
Info about event
Time
Location
Jens Chr. Skous Vej 4, 8000 Aarhus C, building 1483, room 312 and online (https://aarhusuniversity.zoom.us/my/imcevent)
Organizer
Abstract
The sustainable management of common resources constitutes a social dilemma with short-term individual interests conflicting with long-term collective interests. In my work, I examine social dilemma situations in which group members have unequal opportunities (e.g., unequal access to a common resource). While previous work suggests that voting on extraction levels can increase sustainable resource management, these voting institutions were often externally imposed. If change has to come from within the group, who is likely to be the one to suggest change when resources are decreasing? What characterizes suggestions made? The current project examines whether the possibility to suggest and vote on new distributions of maximum extraction levels increases sustainable resource management and whether the effect depends on the (in)equality among group members.
About the speaker
Laila Elina Nockur, Assistant Professor, Department of Psychology and Behavioural Sciences, Aarhus University
Free of charge - All are welcome