Grace Miao, PhD candidate, Department of Communication, UCLA

Abstract: Every day, people strike up conversations—some remain surface-level, while others spark instant connection. What makes certain interactions click? Social interactions rely on subtle, moment-by-moment cues—a shift in word choice, a nod, a frown—that reflect internal psychological and neurocognitive processes. While classic interpersonal communication theories like social penetration theory (Altman & Taylor, 1973) describe how relationships deepen through reciprocal self-disclosure, they offer limited insight into how these dynamics unfold in real time.

To address this gap, I conducted a between-subjects experiment with 70 dyads of strangers engaging in "get-to-know-you" conversations on either shallow or deep topics. Brain activity was measured using functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS), a portable neuroimaging technology, and behaviors were recorded on video.

In this talk, I present a multi-method approach to studying how connections are formed. I will cover: (1) the neural signatures of stranger bonding, (2) linking the brain with verbal and nonverbal signals using an Information Theory framework and deep neural network approach, (3) theoretical modeling: a simple dynamic framework to describe interpersonal synchrony and complementarity, and (4) the Dynamic Interaction and Multimodal Signals (DIMS) Dashboard, a novel tool for combining qualitative and quantitative analyses of interaction.

Together, this work bridges neuroscience, machine learning, and qualitative analysis to better understand the initial formation of meaningful connections.

Inge-Marie Eigsti, Professor of Clinical Psychology in the Department of Psychological Sciences at the University of Connecticut, and Director of Research for the Institute for Brain and Cognitive Sciences

Abstract: In classical approaches to cognition, sensory, motor, and emotional experiences are stripped of domain-specific perceptual and sensorimotor information, and represented in abstract form. In the embodied cognition framework, representations retain the initial imprint of the perceptual and motor systems thought which information was acquired. In this talk, I propose that autism is characterized by the reduced temporal coordination of motor and conceptual information; this change is evident in the differences in comprehension and production of co-speech gestures by autistic people, as well as in differences in implicit mimicry of motor behaviors. The "embodied account” of autism that helps us to understand social experiences and is driven in part by significant but subtle motor deficits.

Aaro Tupasela, senior research fellow, Department of Sociology, University of Helsinki

Abstract: Data sharing has become a major political and scientific pre-occupation during recent years. The European Health Data Space (EHDS) initiative in Europe, as well as the recent US digital health initiative have garnered major interest by investors and companies alike who are seeking to gain market share in a growing industry boosted By AI and seemingly endless promises of health and wealth.

In this talk I present research findings from the Finnish context where the sharing of biobank samples and health and social welfare data has been underway for many years now. In many ways the setting-up of Findata, the Finnish permit authority which grants permits and facilitates access to social and healthcare data has served as a template for the setting-up of the EHDS. The early years of operation and setting-up of Findata, suggest, however, that there exist a multitude of different types of organizations which collect and share data. These organizations have very different capacities to support data sharing activities, which can have significant impact on the time it takes to access data. These cautionary tales of data work in practice serve to illustrate some of the difficulties associated with data sharing and the setting-up of data sharing infrastructures in practice

Janis Zickfeld, Assistant Professor, Department of Management, Aarhus University

Abstract: People experience a range of emotions daily, and their functional value remains unquestioned. However, the question how to conceptualize an emotion remains a heavily discussed topic in emotion science. This is mainly attributed to the fact that existing theories are verbal descriptions about phenomena and make it difficult to derive accurate predictions or compare them. To address these issues, we conceptualize emotions as causal relations among their components (e.g., cognitions, physiology, feelings, expressions, motivations) - introducing a network model of emotions. Based on reviews, simulations, and data we provide first evidence that a) a simple network model can account for the most central findings of conflicting alternative theories, b) better explains co-occurrence of emotions, and c) and addresses various evidence on emotion duration. The network model provides a starting point towards a more formalized theory of emotions. 

Paul Smaldino, Professor, Cognitive and Information Sciences, University of California, Merced

Abstract: Theodosius Dobzhansky famously wrote in 1973, "Nothing in biology makes sense except in light of evolution." Biology is, of course, the study of living things. Humans are living things. Therefore, to study humans is to engage in biology. Yet, despite the prominent of Darwinian theory in the study of non-human animals, there is still widespread resistance to an evolutionary mindset when studying humans. Much of this is understandable. In the 1970s, Darwinian theory had little to say about human behavior and culture. Contributions from "social Darwinism" were racist and misguided, while evolutionary psychology has largely failed to capture the richness of the human experience. I will discuss an expanded view of evolutionary systems, including gene-culture coevolution and modern theories of cultural evolution, that show us why an evolutionary perspective offers much to the study of human cognition, behavior, and culture. I will highlight some of my own work in this area, focusing on models of identity, social learning, and collective problem-solving. 

Mette Leonard Høeg, postdoctoral researcher, Interacting Minds Centre, Aarhus University

Abstract: The common intuition of epistemic benefit of psychedelic experiences is one of the most philosophically interesting effects of these substances. In recent years, academic philosophers have begun to debate the questions it raises: Do psychedelic experiences really have significant epistemic benefits? If so, what kinds of benefits are they, and how can they best be understood?

In this paper, I propose that the relatively new scholarly discussion about learning from psychedelic experience can benefit from interaction with an older scholarly discussion about learning from literary experience. There are significant parallels between the two domains, and people who read great imaginative fiction and people who have transformative psychedelic experiences both report gaining new knowledge of some kind that typically (a) is consistent with naturalism and (b) seems irreducible to new factual or propositional knowledge. 

To illustrate this idea, I apply some ideas about the transformative epistemic potential of literature to the epistemic analysis of psychedelic experience with emphasis on an important commonality: both psychedelic experience and great imaginative literature can facilitate a shift from ‘head’ knowledge to ‘heart’ knowledge. I then explore two common and interrelated mechanisms that may underlie this shift: (i) altered patterns of attention and (ii) the deployment of new or under-used representational styles.

The paper is both an articulation of a specific set of proposals and a call for pursuit of a research agenda. Poetics and aesthetics are already significantly influencing our understanding of psychedelics and are present, if often unnoticed, in psychedelic research. The paper forms part, then, of a broader argument that poetics are crucial for understanding and mapping the phenomenology and epistemology of psychedelic experiences.

Thalia Wheatley, professor, department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Dartmouth

Abstract: Language is often hailed as the driving force behind cultural evolution. Yet its true power goes beyond simply voicing thoughts; it lies in establishing a common framework of meaning that allows for the sharing and co-creation of ideas. Conversation provides a platform for minds to meet, enabling us to think collaboratively. In this talk, I will present research on how conversation brings minds into alignment and examine the features of interaction that facilitate this convergence. Lastly, I will discuss recent breakthroughs that shed new light on how minds interact and the necessity of social interaction for the resilience of neural and social systems.

Marieke van Vugt, associate professor, Bernoulli Institute of Mathematics, Computer Science and Artificial intelligence, University of Groningen

Abstract: We spend a substantial amount of our waking time mind-wandering. Despite popular belief, I do not think that is a bad thing necessarily. It can be very useful for planning and creativity. Mind-wandering only becomes harmful when it is so "sticky" that it is difficult to disengage from, and therefore interferes with other important tasks of life. For this reason, I am very interested in tracking such sticky thinking in the lab. I will demonstrate different methods to assess sticky thinking, for example based on computerized tasks or based on EEG. I will show how rumination may be a particular example of sticky thinking, and how this sticky thinking differs between individuals who are more versus less depressed.  Finally, I will present my ideas on how different contemplative practices may help to reduce the stickiness of our thinking.

Nicola Simonetti, Bridging Fellow in Medical Humanities, Department of English Studies, Durham University

Abstract: This talk explores obsessive-compulsive time through a novel nonclinical lens, proposing a speculative time complex that challenges obsessive-compulsive presentist frameworks. Drawing on first-person lived experience, epistemologies of time, and Critical Disability Studies, I argue that obsessive-compulsive distress is not rooted in the present but originates in an ‘elsewhen’ shaped by an uncertain past and a speculative future. To conceptualise this temporal dynamic, I engage with Armen Avanessian and Suhail Malik’s theory of the postcontemporary, which deprioritises the present by demonstrating how time is increasingly structured by the past and, especially, the future. Like the postcontemporary, I propose that obsessive-compulsive temporality can be approached in a way that no longer requires explaining the movement of the past and the future on the basis of the present, and I reflect on the importance of language – particularly its tense and modal structures – as a critical site for articulating the speculative time complex of obsessive-compulsive disorder.